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Abstract 
Touch is our most interpersonal sense, and so it stands to reason that we represent not only our own bodily 
experiences, but also those felt by others. This review will summarise brain and behavioural research on 
vicarious tactile perception (mirror touch). Specifically, we will focus on vicarious touch across the lifespan in 
typical and atypical groups, and will identify the knowledge gaps that are in urgent need of filling by examining 
what is known about how individuals differ within and between typical and atypical groups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The tactile sensory modality represents information in personal space (i.e., on the body 
surface) and has garnered accelerated interest within multisensory and body-related research 
communities. To illustrate, the abstract book of the annual meeting of the International 
Multisensory Research Forum in 2005 (Rovereto, Italy) contained 159 instances of the words 
touch, tactile and somatosensory. Ten years later in 2015 (Pisa, Italy), there were 418 such 
instances. 
Touch as a sensory modality (and its interaction with other senses, particularly vision) 
is so important in these research arenas because it provides a fundamental experience of our 
own body that is critical for the development and experience of one’s sense of self (e.g., 
Blanke et al., 2015; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2010; Legrand, 2006; Rochat and Striano, 2000). 
Intertwined with the experience of ourselves as agentive bodies, touch is also important in 
our everyday social interactions from birth through to old age. Social touch can affect the 
way we feel about and behave toward others (see Gallace and Spence, 2010). Non-human and 
human animal studies indicate that bodily contact forges positive affiliative bonds between 
two or more individuals (e.g., Boccia, 1986; Coelho et al., 1983; Light et al., 2005). 
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Brain mechanisms involved in representing the first-hand experience of touch involve 
a number of subsystems depending on a) the type and location of tactile input and b) the 
function of tactile receptors. This input typically leads to neural activation within a set of 
brain regions: the somatosensory cortices. In recent decades a number of findings have 
suggested that the somatosensory cortices are not only involved in the first-hand experience 
of touch, but also the perception of touch to others (hereafter referred to as vicarious tactile 
perception or mirror touch; see Keysers et al., 2010 for review). Vicarious tactile perception 
has been linked to brain activation in a network of brain regions involved in the first-hand 
experience of touch (e.g., primary and secondary somatosensory cortices), sensorimotor 
processing (e.g., premotor and parietal cortices), and self–other distinction (e.g., superior 
temporal sulcus). In this regard, vicarious tactile perception in the brain is often referred to as 
being a consequence of a mirroring system for touch (or mirror-touch system) — a neural 
network that responds to touch applied both to the self and to others. Brain activation in the 
mirror-touch system has been reported to have a somatotopic arrangement (i.e., seeing touch 
to another person’s face activates representations of one’s own face) (e.g,. Keysers et al., 
2004; Blakemore et al., 2005). Patterns of brain activation in the mirror-touch system have 
also been shown to vary within and between groups (for reviews of how vicarious perception 
has been shown to differ according to the presence of a variety of clinical and subclinical 
conditions see Lockwood, 2016; Ward and Banissy, 2015). 
In this review, we will provide an overview of the evidence for, and the underlying 
mechanisms proposed to explain, vicarious touch in neurotypical adults and what is known 
about their inter-individual differences. This will be followed by a similar section dedicated 
to mirror-touch synaesthesia, one subclinical condition that has been associated with altered 
vicarious tactile perception in which the visual observation of touch leads to the conscious 
feeling of touch on the body.  The third section will give an account of vicarious tactile 
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perceptions from a developmental perspective, examining the evidence for vicarious touch in 
infants and older adults. 
The aim of this review is to identify gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the 
mechanisms of vicarious touch, how they develop and how they differ in certain subgroups 
(e.g., synaesthetes) and between individuals within a population. We believe that the study of 
inter-individual differences is instrumental in delineating the mechanisms of vicarious touch. 
This is because the aspects of personality, sensorimotor aptitude, or social mindedness, along 
which individuals may differ from one another, may form the basis of what makes atypical 
groups (e.g., mirror-touch synaesthetes, depersonalised individuals) vary from the typical 
population. These inter-individual differences may have early developmental origins. 
Therefore, understanding individual differences in vicarious touch across the entire lifespan 
will help to explain the similarities as well as the differences between typical and atypical 
populations. 
 
2. Vicarious Touch in Neurotypical Adults 
 
There is copious evidence for the representation of other’s touch in brain and behaviour. In 
the following, we give a brief overview of vicarious touch research over the past decade and 
examine the evidence for inter-individual differences in mirror touch in neurotypical adults. 
The majority of what is known about vicarious touch comes from fMRI studies. In 
2004, Keysers et al. first reported that the observation of another person’s legs (or of blocks 
of wood) being stroked with a brush caused activations in the secondary somatosensory 
cortex (SII) of the observer, similar to activations in response to being brushed on their own 
legs. At a similar time, Blakemore et al. (2005) presented the first published case study of 
mirror-touch synaesthesia (see Section 3 below). Their group of non-synaesthetic control 
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participants showed somatotopically organised activity in response to observed touch in the 
primary somatosensory cortex (SI), in addition to activity in the premotor and parietal 
cortices (fronto-parietal action mirroring network) and superior temporal sulcus (self–other 
distinction network). Since then, several fMRI studies have been published showing vicarious 
activations of the somatosensory cortices, both SI and SII, as well as associated activity in 
frontoparietal mirroring networks, self–other distinction networks, and insula (Cardini et al., 
2011; Ebisch et al., 2008, 2011; Holle et al., 2013; Kuehn et al., 2013, 2014; Meyer et al., 
2011; Nummenmaa et al., 2014; Schaefer et al., 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013; see Bufalari and 
Ionta, 2013; Keysers et al., 2010 for reviews; see also Lamm et al., 2015, for evidence of 
vicarious touch perception networks specific for pleasant touch and for unpleasant touch). 
Distinct neural indices of vicarious tactile perception have also been provided in EEG/ERP 
and MEG studies (e.g., Adler et al., 2016; Bufalari et al., 2007; Coll et al., 2015; Deschrijver 
et al., 2015; Lankinen et al., 2016; Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Pihko et al., 2010; 
Streltsova and McCleery, 2014). 
Interestingly, one of the most recently published fMRI studies (Chan and Baker, 
2015) found consistent activations of posterior parietal cortices (PPC) but not of SI or SII 
during touch observation. This led the authors to question the role of somatosensory cortices 
in favour of PPC. PPC contains visual-tactile multisensory neural populations coding for 
body–object interactions (see Chan and Baker, 2015) and shared body maps (e.g., Bolognini 
and Maravita, 2007; Ishida et al., 2010), and is the main source of visual inputs to the fronto-
parietal mirroring system (e.g., Keysers et al., 2010; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). 
More causal implications of both SI and PPC in vicarious touch have come from 
transcranial magnetic and direct-current stimulation (TMS/tDCS) studies (Bolognini et al., 
2011a, b, 2013, 2014; Wood et al., 2010). For example, Bolognini et al. (2011) showed that 
rTMS over contralateral, but not ipsilateral, SI selectively impaired visual perceptions of a 
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hand touching another hand, while rTMS over SII interfered with visual perception only in a 
non-touch-specific manner. After stimulating SI with paired-pulse TMS, Bolognini et al.’s 
(2014) participants misreported feeling touches on the hand contralateral to stimulation while 
viewing a similar hand being touched. This was found both when SI was primed 
intracortically and when it was primed via posterior parietal cortical stimulation. These TMS 
studies thus suggest that SI is causally involved in vicarious touch via links with posterior 
parietal cortex, which are activated by body-related visual inputs (Keysers et al., 2010). 
It is thought that there are functional dissociations within SI, where earlier processing 
stages (in BA3) are confined to signals that originate on our own body (remain ‘private’, 
Keysers et al., 2010; but see Lankinen et al., 2016 for claims that this may differ for haptic 
touch), while later processing stages (in BA2, SII, and probably BA1) may include 
representations of other people's somatic experiences (see also Schaefer et al., 2012). This 
mirroring aspect of SI is considered to be part of a broader neural network responsible for 
mirroring (e.g., Avikainen et al., 2002; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012; 
Molnar-Szakasc and Uddin, 2013; Pineda, 2005; Ruby and Decety, 2001) and emotion 
recognition (e.g., Adolphs et al., 2000; Wood et al., 2016). 
Bufalari and Ionta (2013) suggested that the mirroring part of the SI has a twofold 
function in social interactions: it encodes the sensory qualities of one’s own and others’ 
bodily sensations via feedback from multisensory areas in the broader frontal-parietal 
network, and is further modulated by the attributed affective components of human tactile 
interactions on the basis of its links with insular cortex. 
In line with this, the sensory qualities of observed touch do appear to affect the 
somatosensory response. In a behavioural study, the enhancement of felt tactile intensity 
during the visual observation of touch on another person’s hand was found to be stronger for 
active than passive touch (Gillmeister, 2014). In another study, Meyer et al. (2011) showed 
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that visual observation of touch can cause differential activity in SI depending on the object 
that was observed to be touched. SI activity has also been found to correlate with the rated 
intensity (Bufalari et al., 2007) and with the rated unpleasantness (Martinez-Jauand et al., 
2012) of observed tactile sensations. In these studies, SI activity was measured 
electrophysiologically and indexed by early somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs) induced 
by median nerve stimulation at around 50 ms post-stimulus onset. The SEP component 
around this time (variably called P50, P45 or P40) is thought to be generated in SI (e.g., 
Allison et al. 1989, 1992; Schubert et al., 2008), and has also been implicated in touch 
mirroring in other ERP studies using mechanical rather than electrical tactile stimulation 
(Adler et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015). 
Interestingly, Martinez-Jauand et al.’s (2012) study reported that P50 amplitudes 
during touch observation were positively correlated with self-reported perspective-taking 
abilities, a cognitive empathy trait. Similarly, individual differences in perspective-taking 
have been found to correlate with hemodynamic S1 responses to observed touch (Schaefer et 
al., 2012) and action-related sounds (Gazzola et al., 2006): individuals with greater 
perspective-taking abilities had greater SI activations. Bolognini et al. (2014) reported that 
the effects of SI transcranial magnetic stimulation on behaviour correlated with reports of 
feeling touch from viewing it, as well as with both perspective-taking and empathic concern. 
Specifically, individuals who misreported feeling touches on the hand contralateral to 
stimulation while viewing a similar hand being touched also felt better able to put themselves 
into others’ shoes, and reported to have more sympathy and concern for others. Greater 
perspective-taking was further associated with greater impairments in encoding the affective 
valence of others’ bodily states resulting from disruption of S1 activity (Bolognini et al., 
2013b). 
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Perspective-taking is one of the cognitive empathy subscales of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983). This subscale measures the extent to which respondents 
take other people’s mental perspective through seven statements such as “I sometimes try to 
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective” and “If 
I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments”, which are scored on a Likert scale according to how well it describes the 
respondent. Empathic concern is an emotional or affective empathy IRI subscale probed 
through statement such as “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate 
than me” and “Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems”. 
It is more typically linked to the individual variation in the degree of activation within brain 
networks involved in the observation of painful touch (e.g., Avenanti et al., 2005; Singer et 
al., 2004). 
In addition to these inconsistencies, it is also noteworthy that no relationships have 
been reported between indices of vicarious touch and other cognitive IRI subscales (fantasy), 
other affective / emotional IRI subscales (personal distress), or between vicarious touch and 
other tools that measure trait empathy (e.g., Empathy Quotient, Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004; Emotional Contagion Scale, Doherty, 1997 — although fewer studies 
have tended to employ these specific measures). In this regard it is of interest that Lamm et 
al.’s (2011) meta-analysis of empathy for pain found that state empathy measures (e.g., trial 
by trial affective ratings) predict empathic cortical activations more sensitively than trait 
measures (e.g., questionnaires like IRI). This strongly indicates that the study of empathy-
related inter-individual differences in mirror touch would benefit from employing 
experimental designs that probe state empathy. 
The affective meaning conveyed by interactive bodily touch has been shown to 
increase S1, S2, and insular activity (Bjornsdotter and Olausson, 2011; Kress et al., 2011). 
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Observing human-based intentional touch causes stronger S1 activations (Ebisch et al., 2008; 
Kress et al., 2011) and engages tactile mirroring processes to a larger extent (Deschrijver et 
al., 2015; Holle et al., 2011; Streltsova and McCleery, 2014), compared to object-based non-
intentional touch. These S1 activations are said to play a key role in understanding the 
affective consequences (Bolognini et al., 2013b) of tactile interactions between people 
(Rossetti et al., 2012). While the observation of facial touch on another person generally 
facilitates tactile detection on the face (Serino et al., 2008, 2009; Vandenbroucke et al., 
2015), this facilitation is measurably increased when observing persons we feel a greater 
affiliation with (Serino et al., 2009; see also Fini et al., 2013). Interestingly, the strongest 
enhancement of tactile detection is in fact seen when observing one’s own face (Cardini et 
al., 2011s, 2013; Serino et al., 2008). In a recent study, somatosensory cortical activity was 
also found to be positively related to one’s own self-reported levels of engagement with the 
haptic contents of a movie showing dynamic bodily interactions with surfaces (water, sand, 
rocks; Lankinen et al., 2016). This suggests that these affective modulations of SI may be 
more than reflecting interpersonal somatic experiences; they may be driven by how well we 
can, and perhaps are willing to, resonate with the viewed touch. Resonance is likely to 
increase the more self-related a viewed bodily experience is. 
It is thought that affective SI modulations are based on its links with insular cortex 
(e.g., Bufalari and Ionta, 2013), which is involved in various aspects of self-awareness (see 
e.g., Blanke et al., 2015) and also has mirroring properties (e.g., Keysers et al., 2010). In 
addition to somatosensory activation, pleasant touch on the arm elicits similar responses in 
the posterior insula during the personal experience and the observation of somebody else’s 
arm being stroked (Bjornsdotter and Olausson, 2011; Ebisch et al., 2011; see also Schaefer et 
al., 2012, for evidence of mid-insular activity). The anterior insula specifically has been 
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implicated in mirror-touch synaesthesia (Blakemore et al., 2005) and in empathy for pain 
(Lamm et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, both SI and posterior insula activity are sensitive to whether the touched 
body part is seen from a first- or third-person perspective (Ebisch et al., 2011; Schaefer et al., 
2009). Behaviourally, visual-spatial perspective has typically been shown to affect tactile 
detection only when painful touch is observed (Bach et al., 2014; Vandenbroucke et al., 
2015). However, Banissy and Ward (2007) have reported a greater impact of viewed touch 
from a first-person relative to third-person perspective on visual-tactile congruency effects 
(see Section 3 below) in mirror-touch synaesthetes and typical adult controls. These findings 
suggest that both SI and insula may encode the source of tactile sensation (self vs. other; or 
more broadly self vs. non-self, see also Section 3) and thus play a role in mediating body 
ownership. In line with this, posterior insula lesions are associated with heautoscopy 
(Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). In heautoscopy a second own body is perceived and strongly 
identified with, such that some patients can feel present in two locations at the same time. 
SI is also thought to be a critical component in the sense of body ownership (Aspell, 
Palluel, and Blanke, 2012; Otsuru et al., 2014). These studies measured systematic changes in 
SI activations during the experience of body ownership of a fake hand or back using 
variations of the rubber hand illusion (RHI). The RHI is an illusion of body ownership in 
which seeing touch to an inanimate hand that occurs in synchrony with first-hand touch to the 
participants’ own hand can lead to a greater sense of body ownership towards the inanimate 
hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). 
In line with this, a recent study from our lab has implicated SI in vicarious tactile 
representations during self-face observation in healthy adults (Adler et al., 2016; see also 
Cardini et al., 2011 for related findings). Importantly, we found that the P45 index of 
vicarious touch was not observable in individuals who feel less connected with their bodily 
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self (high levels of depersonalisation). Depersonalisation is a psychological condition 
characterised by estrangement, detachment or disconnection from one’s own being (e.g., 
Simeon, 2004), and in its mild form it has a high life-time prevalence (up to 80%, e.g., 
Hunter, Sierra, and David, 2004). Interestingly, individuals with higher levels of 
depersonalisation are also reported to have higher levels of body ownership illusions 
(Kanayama et al., 2009; see also Sierra et al., 2002), in which SI has been implicated (e.g., 
Aspell et al., 2012; Otsuru et al., 2014). This further supports the suggestion that the (altered) 
sense of bodily self is associated with (atypical) SI activity. 
The involvement of the insular pathway to SI may be of particular interest in these 
phenomena. This is because insula activation is classically associated with interoceptive 
awareness (anterior insula: Ernst et al., 2012; posterior insula: Kuehn et al.2016). 
Interoceptive awareness is the ability to perceive and regulate one’s attention to bodily 
signals (e.g., Mehling et al., 2012). Aspects of interoceptive awareness are in turn negatively 
correlated with feelings of dissociation from one’s bodily self (Mehling et al., 2012), which 
has been shown to reduce vicarious touch responses at SI stages of processing (Adler et al., 
2016). 
A stronger sense of bodily self also entails a stronger sense of the difference between 
self and non-self sources of stimulation. This may be because incoming tactile information 
can be better mapped to existing models of self-related bodily experiences (e.g., Tsakiris et 
al., 2011), processes in which the insula is critically involved (Critchley et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, the RHI, which relies on a blurring of self–other boundaries through 
synchronous visual-tactile stimulation, is stronger in individuals with a more malleable sense 
of self: within neurotypicals (Tsakiris et al., 2011), within anorexic individuals and between 
anorexic and healthy control groups (Eshkevari et al., 2012; see also Mussap and Salton, 
2006), between neurotypical groups with low and high levels of depersonalisation 
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(Kanayama et al., 2009), and between schizophrenic and healthy control groups (e.g., 
Thakkar et al., 2011). More directly related to vicarious sensations, Adler et al. (2016) 
showed reduced differences between later-stage SEP indices of vicarious touch (P200) during 
self-face and other-face observation in individuals with high levels of depersonalisation. 
Also, Bird et al. (2010) found weaker vicarious pain responses in the anterior insula of 
autistic and control individuals with higher levels of alexithymia, which is also related to 
interoceptive deficits and low trait empathy. 
Altogether, this suggests that the study of interoceptive awareness and its multiple 
dimensions, and the associated processes of distinguishing self and non-self sources of 
stimulation, may provide a rich ground for understanding inter-individual differences in 
vicarious touch perception. 
 
3. Conscious Vicarious Tactile Experiences in Mirror-Touch Synaesthesia 
 
While the majority of people do not experience a conscious sensation of touch on their own 
body from pure observation, for those with mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS), a first-hand 
tactile sensation is experienced (Ward and Banissy, 2015).  The prevalence of MTS is 
estimated at 1.6%; however, self-reported prevalence is much higher, at around 10.8% 
(Banissy et al., 2009a). The 1.6% estimate comes from participants that objectively differ to 
control participants on behavioural tests designed to verify the presence of MTS, and 
therefore this conservative estimate and approach is considered best practice for studies on 
MTS.  A prevalence of 1.6% also relates to the proportion of individuals that experience 
conscious response to observed touch to humans, but it is of note that some individuals also 
report vicarious touch in response to inanimate stimuli (such as objects or dummy body parts) 
(Banissy and Ward, 2007; Banissy et al., 2009a; Holle et al., 2011). 
	13	
	
In terms of authenticity, MTS has most commonly been authenticated behaviourally 
using a visual-tactile congruity task developed by Banissy and Ward (2007), in which 
participants report the location of a tactile stimulus, while observing another person (or 
object) being touched. Observed touch can either be spatially congruent or incongruent with 
the self-reported location of synaesthetic induced touch (i.e., the location where an individual 
reporting MTS claims to experience a sensation when observing touch). Compared with 
controls, MTS participants typically make more errors and show a greater congruency effect 
in their responses. This indicates that the observed touch generates a tactile sensation on the 
synaesthete’s body that feels similar to first-hand tactile experience, leading to greater 
interference. This pattern of behaviour (i.e., greater interference on the visual-tactile 
congruity task) is also seen in a manner that is consistent with intra-individual differences 
within the MTS group.For instance, Banissy and Ward (2007) identify two contrasting spatial 
reference frames for vicarious tactile sensations in MTS: a) anatomical (e.g., when observing 
another person being touched on the left cheek, the synaesthete reports a sensation of touch 
on their own left cheek) and b) mirrored (e.g., when observing another person being touched 
on the left cheek, touch is reported on the right cheek, mapping to the same side of the body 
as if looking in a mirror). That is to say that an individual with a mirrored MTS shows 
congruency effects under a mirrored frame of reference, whereas an individual with an 
anatomical MTS shows congruency effects under an anatomical frame of reference (see also 
White & Davies, 2012). 
Complementing behavioural differences, functional MRI studies have shown that, 
compared with controls, MTS participants display greater activation of both primary (SI) and 
secondary (SII) somatosensory cortex during the observation of touch (Blakemore et al., 
2005; Holle et al., 2013) and that this can match a pattern that would be expected given their 
self-reported frame of reference (e.g., mirrored frame of reference; Holle et al., 2013). In this 
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regard, individuals with MTS show greater activation in the same regions involved in 
mirroring touch in typical adults. In addition, MTS participants show increased grey matter 
density in SII than controls (Holle et al., 2013). These observations have contributed to the 
development of Threshold Theory, which assumes that hyperactivity of tactile mirror systems 
underlies conscious vicarious experience in MTS (Blakemore et al., 2005; see Ward and 
Banissy, 2015 for review). In support of Threshold Theory, congruency effects akin to those 
found in MTS on the visual-tactile congruity task described above have been induced in 
controls by increasing excitability in somatosensory cortex with transcranial direct-current 
stimulation (tDCS; Bolognini et al., 2013a). 
While evidence from fMRI and tDCS studies points to a hyperactive mirror system 
for touch in MTS (Blakemore et al., 2005; Bolognini et al., 2013a; Holle et al., 2013), the 
cause of this increased activity remains unclear. Furthermore, a somatosensory hyperactivity 
account cannot explain additional structural brain differences observed in MTS, such as 
reduced grey matter density in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the right temporoparietal 
junction (rTPJ; Holle et al., 2013). The more recent Self–Other Theory (Banissy and Ward, 
2013; Ward and Banissy, 2015) has been proposed to account for some of these factors. 
Broadly, Self–Other Theory suggests that vicarious experiences in MTS are related to 
atypical abilities in distinguishing the self from others (or more broadly in distinguishing ‘me 
from not me’ in the case of objects). One mechanism by which this is thought to occur is 
through an extension of bodily self-awareness, with MTS being linked to a more expansive 
plasticity of the bodily self (Banissy et al., 2009a; Banissy and Ward, 2013; see also Tamir & 
Mitchell, 2010). In line with this, individuals with MTS experience the rubber hand illusion 
(RHI; see Section 2) and enfacement illusion (Tsakiris, 2008) without any tactile stimulation 
(Aimola Davies and White, 2013; Maister et al., 2013).  Importantly, for non-synaesthetes, 
the RHI requires visual and tactile congruency (i.e., tactile stimulation of the participants’ 
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own hand, while viewing synchronous touch on the dummy), but for MTS participants 
simply seeing touch to the dummy hand can lead to an atypical sense of ownership (Aimola 
Davies and White, 2013). 
In addition to body-ownership, Cioffi et al. (2016) have demonstrated that MTS is 
associated with a greater sense of vicarious agency. In that study, participants were tested on 
a vicarious agency task in which they saw hand actions performed in a mirror placed in front 
of them while listening to action instructions that matched or mismatched with the actions 
performed. While the actions in the mirror appeared to the participant in a congruent location 
with where they would expect to see actions performed by their own body, the seen actions 
were actually performed by an experimenter (i.e., another person) while the participants were 
at rest (thereby inducing blurred boundaries between the self and other). Participants with 
MTS showed higher judgments of agency (relative to typical adult controls) over the 
experimenter’s movements in the match condition. MTS participants also showed a stronger 
sense of ownership towards the experimenter’s hand compared to controls, but importantly 
this was in both the match and mismatch conditions; suggesting that merely seeing another’s 
body making an action in a location that corresponds to where one expects to see one’s own 
body was sufficient for mirror-touch synaesthetes to treat other people’s bodies as their own.  
Together with the findings on sense of ownership in MTS described above (also see Maister 
et al., 2013), this evidence indicates a greater susceptibility to self–other merging in MTS, 
which may contribute to altered patterns of vicarious response seen in this group. 
Consistent with the notion that altered malleability of the self may contribute to 
mirror-touch synaesthesia, non-synaesthetes show greater levels of vicarious response to 
others that are perceived similar to themselves. For example, Adler et al. (2016) argued that 
vicarious touch as indexed by SEPs like P45 is stronger for touch that can be more easily 
(mis)attributed to the self. Indeed it may be suggested that SI activations in experimental 
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studies of vicarious touch discussed in Section 2 reflect an amount of (mis)identification with 
a viewed body part (see Bach et al., 2014; Mahayana et al., 2014; Schaefer et al., 2006 for 
related arguments). This may be because these studies typically manipulate the viewed body 
part’s location, orientation and/or felt experience of touch relative to the observer’s own, 
hidden body part. Since the typically used body parts (e.g., hand, arm, leg or back) are less 
obviously one’s own than the face, an identification with the viewed body part may occur at 
SI stages of sensory processing, not only when viewing one’s own body, but also when the 
touched body part is a another person’s (see Bufalari et al., 2007; Deschrijver et al., 2015; 
Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Schaefer et al., 2012). 
Another important process that we tend to implement during vicarious perception is 
the ability to control the degree to which we privilege representations of the self or 
representations of other people. For example, in order to experience appropriate levels of 
vicarious response we must enhance the representations of others and inhibit the 
representation of one’s own affective or sensory state; however in order to prevent excessive 
personal distress from another’s negative state, it can be adaptive to inhibit the representation 
of the other’s affective state and enhance the representations of the self.  Interestingly, and 
consistent with Self–Other Theory, individuals with MTS have also been shown to have a 
difficulty with self–other control in situations that require inhibiting representations of others 
while boosting representations of the self. In the study by Santiesteban et al. (2015a), MTS 
participants showed impaired performance on an imitation-inhibition task requiring 
representations of the self to be enhanced, but representations of others to be inhibited; but 
comparable performance with controls on visual perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks 
which require enhancing representations of others while inhibiting the self (Santiesteban et 
al., 2015a). In this regard, it seems that even in the absence of conscious vicarious tactile 
experiences (i.e., no synaesthetic inducer), individuals with MTS show difficulties inhibiting 
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others. This difference is not well accounted for by Threshold Theory, but is in line with 
predictions of Self–Other Theory that promote the hypothesis that atypical self–other abilities 
lead to altered vicarious response. Importantly, it also appears that in non-synaesthetes self–
other control mechanisms play a key role in vicarious perception. For instance, De Guzman 
and colleagues (2016) show that training the ability to control self–other representations can 
modulate the degree of vicarious pain experienced towards to other people. Mechanisms of 
self-other control have also been implicated in modulating imitative responses driven by 
motor mirror systems (Brass, Ruby and Spengler, 2009; Hogeveen et al., 2015). With this 
collected evidence in mind, interactions between mechanisms involved in mirroring others’ 
experience (as per Threshold Theory) and self–other distinction (as per Self–Other Theory) 
may manifest themselves as individual differences in vicarious perception. 
 
4. Vicarious Touch across the Lifespan 
Like most psychological and neuroscientific research, all of the previously discussed studies 
have involved young adults. We know little about vicarious touch in infants, young children, 
and older people. In this section we provide an overview of developmental studies of 
(vicarious) touch and related multi-sensory-motor processes to date. 
The tactile sense is the first to develop in the womb and matures earlier than other 
sensory modalities (e.g., Atkinson and Braddick, 1982; Bernhardt, 1987). Developmental 
studies have shown that SEPs can be reliably detected in preterm infants from the 25th week 
of gestation (Hrbek et al., 1973; Taylor et al., 1996) when their hand is stimulated. Reliable 
SEPs in response to vibrotactile stimuli in infants in the second half of their first year of life 
have also recently been shown (Rigato et al., 2014). In this study the strongest responses 
were recorded over somatosensory regions in the hemisphere contralateral to the stimulated 
hand, in line with another recent infant study (Saby et al., 2015). 
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It is likely that vicarious tactile experiences develop alongside the representation of 
one’s own tactile sensations. Developmental psychologists surmised that experiences like 
seeing and feeling your own body move provide the multi-sensory-motor contingencies that 
are instrumental in giving rise to bodily self-consciousness (e.g., Rochat and Striano, 2000; 
Zmyj et al., 2011). 
Consistent with this assumption, recent studies have shown that sensitivity to the 
synchrony between seen and felt body-related stimuli may be present from birth (Filippetti et 
al., 2013, 2015; see also Addabbo et al., 2015). Filippetti et al. (2013) demonstrated that 
newborns prefer to look at an infant face being touched by a brush when a synchronous 
tactile stimulation is applied to their own face. Such effects are specific to upright faces only 
(vs. inverted; Filippetti et al., 2013), present for hand-to-hand touch but not object-to-hand 
touch (Addabbo et al., 2015), and stronger when touch is applied to a spatially congruent (vs. 
incongruent; Filippetti et al., 2015) location on the face. This suggests that newborns’ 
preference for synchronous (vs. asynchronous) visual-tactile stimulation is relatively specific 
to stimuli that are more clearly related to their own bodies. 
In a subsequent functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) study, Filippetti et al. 
(2014) demonstrated that five-month-old infants also process visual-motor information 
related to the body. Using delayed vs. real-time video feedback of infants’ own facial and 
upper body movement, they showed a significantly reduced cortical response when visual-
motor stimuli were not presented in synchrony. 
Further related to the study of shared bodily experiences is prior work examining 
infants’ brain responses during action production and observation of another person 
performing an action with her hand, or her foot (Marshall et al., 2013; Saby et al., 2013). 
Those studies found that at 14 months of age, a somatotopic pattern of mu rhythm 
desynchronization — indicating an increase in sensorimotor cortical activity — was present 
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during both action production and action observation. Moreover, mu desynchronisation was 
somatotopically organised, that is, larger over the somatosensory areas specific to hands or 
feet respectively (see also Marshall and Meltzoff, 2014). This was also true for the 
somatotopic response pattern recorded at 7 months of age as shown by the somatosensory 
evoked potential elicited by brief tactile stimulation of infants’ hands and feet (Saby et al., 
2015). These findings indicate that relatively sophisticated interconnections between the 
representations of the self and others’ bodies are present shortly after the first year of life. 
Magnetoencephalographical (MEG) techniques have also lent support for the notion 
of shared multi-sensory-motor body maps in early childhood. In a study by Remijn et al. 
(2014), three- to four-year-old children received touch stimulation to their index finger and at 
the same time watched a video of someone else being touched either at the index finger 
(congruent visuotactile information) or on the toe (incongruent visuotactile information). 
Over the contralateral somatosensory cortex, a middle-latency equivalent current dipole 
(ECD), occurring around 100 ms after stimulus onset, was modulated by the visual 
information so that it was higher for the congruent visuotactile information than for the 
incongruent visuotactile information or a tactile-only condition. This provides evidence that 
somatotopically organised interactions between visual and tactile information, which may 
originate very early in life (Filippetti et al., 2015), are clearly present in children. 
During development in childhood and younger adulthood, functional enlargements of 
the topographically organised maps in somatosensory cortex are associated with learning and 
enhanced tactile performance as a result of strengthened connectivity (e.g., Elbert et al., 
1995; Godde et al., 2000; Pascual-Leone and Torres, 1993; Ragert et al., 2004). Toward older 
adulthood, however, enlargements of the somatotopic maps are thought to reflect greater 
functional overlap between maps due to reduced intracortical inhibition (e.g., Kalisch et al., 
2009). In line with this, old-age-related cortical reorganisation has been shown to be 
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associated with decline in tactile acuity and sensorimotor coordination (e.g., Kalisch et al., 
2009; Spengler et al., 1995). 
It would stand to reason that the decline in tactile performance related to cortical 
reorganisations in late adulthood also entails a decline in vicarious tactile representations. We 
are not aware of any studies actually demonstrating this, however. There are no studies that 
show, for example, that the increasing functional overlap of somatotopic maps in SI extends 
to representing touch on another’s body, or that tactile perceptual performance decreases both 
for self-related and for non-self-related stimuli. 
A further question is whether the presumed decline in vicarious touch precedes or co-
occurs with the decline of self-related tactile representations. Individual differences in age-
related decline of vicarious touch are also not known, but it may be speculated that those with 
relatively higher levels of intracortical inhibition would (have higher levels of vicarious touch 
and) be resistant for longer toward the decline in tactile acuity, sensorimotor coordination, as 
well as the accurate representation of another’s somatosensory experiences. 
Several other findings would also suggest a decline in vicarious tactile perceptions in 
older adulthood. For instance, reductions in vicarious perception have been associated with 
higher levels of alexithymia (e.g., Bird et al., 2010); alexithymia is associated with a 
difficulty identifying and labelling emotions from bodily cues (Bagby et al., 1994). 
Alexithymia has also been identified as a predictor of depersonalisation disorder (Simeon et 
al., 2009); which, as noted above, has been linked with modulations of vicarious tactile 
perception in younger adults (Adler et al., 2016).  Interestingly, older adults tend to show 
greater self-reported alexithymia than younger adults (Lane et al.1998; Mattila et al., 2006; 
Paradiso et al., 2008). In this regard, one might predict that aging would be associated with 
declines in vicarious tactile perception (at least in those older adults that show greater self-
reported alexithymia). This is an avenue that we are currently exploring. 
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In addition to changes in alexithymia in later life, it has been widely reported that 
older adults also show impairments in other aspects of social perception that might point to 
declined vicarious perception. For example, older adults tend to show reductions in emotion 
perception (Ruffman et al., 2008), which can act as an important precursor to empathy (also 
see Yang and Banissy, 2016 for review).  Indeed, self-reported trait cognitive empathy (as 
assessed by the Empathy Quotient; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) appears reduced 
for older compared with younger adults (Bailey et al., 2008). As described in Section 2, in 
young adult participants decreased self-reported cognitive empathy has repeatedly been 
linked with reduced brain activation in somatosensory areas during vicarious tactile 
perception (Bolognini et al., 2013a, 2014; Martinez-Jauand et al., 2012; Schaefer et al., 
2012). With this in mind, if older adults recruit similar brain mechanisms, one might predict 
that vicarious somatosensory representations could decrease in later life. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In over a decade of research on vicarious touch, very few studies have looked explicitly at 
inter-individual differences. Overall, the evidence suggests that embodiment and self–other 
processes are important in determining the extent of vicarious tactile perception. The extent 
to which observed touch is embodied by the observer appears to depend on several factors: 
our prerequisite sense of bodily self (e.g., Adler et al., 2016) and how much we engage with 
the viewed touch (e.g., Lankinen et al., 2016). Our sense of self, as measured by our 
interoceptive awareness, our sense of body ownership, and our sense of agency, for example, 
is subject to large inter-individual differences (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2011), and this looks to be 
a promising avenue for vicarious touch research. Indeed the sense of self has been shown to 
be altered in individuals that experience mirror-touch synaesthesia (e.g., Maister et al., 2013; 
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Aimola-Davies and White, 2013; Cioffi et al., 2016), and this variability in the malleability of 
the self is considered to play a key role in contributing to the degree to which we experience 
conscious versus unconscious vicarious sensations (Ward and Banissy, 2015).  The sense of 
self is also altered in a variety of atypical populations (e.g., alexithymic, depersonalised, 
eating disordered and schizophrenic individuals), in whom the vicarious representation of 
touch is understudied. 
Vicarious somatosensory activity may also be modulated by inter-individual 
differences in cognitive and affective empathy (e.g., Bolognini et al. 2013a, 2014, Schaefer et 
al., 2012). While findings are not entirely consistent across studies, the most frequently 
reported relationship is between vicarious touch and the ability to cognitively represent the 
mental contents of another person’s mind (‘perspective-taking’). It is important to note that 
the perspective-taking skills measured with the IRI are more similar to mentalising skills 
(e.g., Rutherford, 2004) than to visual-spatial perspective taking, which has been used to 
elucidate self-other-related processing (e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2012, 2015a; see also Heyes, 
2014; Santiesteban et al., 2015b). Future studies should clarify how these sets of skills are 
linked to one another and to vicarious tactile perception. Further, measuring empathy (and 
other personality aspects) in a situational manner (e.g., on a trial-by-trial basis) during touch 
observation may serve to uncover the relationships between personality and vicarious touch 
perception better than measuring self-reported traits. 
Future studies should also investigate how vicarious touch relates to the five-factor 
model of personality (see Bufalari and Ionta, 2013, for a similar call). Individual five-factor 
traits are known to be associated both with individual empathic traits (e.g., Mooradian et al., 
2011) and with SI activity in response to first-hand touch (Schaefer et al., 2012, 2013). While 
this would suggest that tactile mirroring mechanisms might be modulated by personality 
traits, to date, these two strands of research have not been combined. 
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The evidence also strongly points to the necessity to test groups other than healthy 
young adults to elucidate the aforementioned embodiment / interoception and self–other 
distinction mechanisms that contribute to individual differences, such as individuals suffering 
from depersonalisation, alexithymia, eating disorders, and schizophrenia. Mirror touch 
synaesthetes present one atypical group that has been studied extensively. Here, there is 
growing evidence linking conscious vicarious perception with altered self–other processing. 
For instance, alterations in self–other perception (e.g., sense of agency and body ownership 
— Aimola-Davies and White, 2013; Cioffi et al., 2016; Maister et al., 2013) and the ability to 
control self–other representations (specifically, difficulties in controlling self–other 
representation in conditions that require the ability to inhibit other people; Santiesteban et al., 
2015b). These findings are consistent with work suggesting that interactions between 
mechanisms involved in mirroring other people’s experiences and self–other representation 
(e.g., self–other control) play a key role in vicarious perception (e.g., Bird and Viding, 2014; 
De Guzman et al., 2016; Lamm et al., 2016). Collectively they point to the notion that the 
interplay between self–other and mirroring processes may manifest themselves as individual 
differences in vicarious touch. 
While a number of important steps have been made in understanding normative 
mechanisms of vicarious tactile perception, less work has focussed on individual variation 
and development. Altogether, developmental studies suggest that common neural 
mechanisms support both infant and adult processing of body-related multisensory and 
sensorimotor stimuli, and that these mechanisms deteriorate in older age, but very little work 
has directly investigated vicarious tactile representations. Future research on tactile mirroring 
needs to include infants, children and older adults, and examination of a range of vicarious 
experiences (e.g., conscious vicarious response; unconscious vicarious response; reduced 
vicarious response). This will permit the ability to map out developmental trajectories, and 
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garner a more holistic understanding of mechanisms contributing to vicarious perception as 
well as of factors contributing to individual variations in these. 
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